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 When scientists are trying to uncover the causes of a given outcome, they often 
make use of statistical information.  Thus, if scientists wanted to know whether there was 
a causal relationship between attending philosophy lectures and learning philosophy, they 
might randomly assign students to either attend or not attend certain lectures and then 
check to see whether those who attended the lectures ended up learning more philosophy 
than those who did not.   
A question now arises as to how ordinary people – people who have no formal 
training in the sciences – typically uncover the causes of particular outcomes.  One 
popular answer to this question is that ordinary people use more or less the same 
techniques that scientists do (e.g., Gopnik et al. 2004; Kelly 1967; Woodward 2003).  Of 
course, ordinary people do not actually write out equations or use precise statistical 
methods, but one might nonetheless claim that they uncover causal relations by looking 
in a more informal way at statistical information and that they actually look for pretty 
much the same sorts of statistical information that scientists do.  At least within social 
psychology, this view is associated with the slogan The person as scientist.  
 Although this ‘person as scientist’ theory remains the dominant view both in 
philosophy and in psychology, recent years have seen the emergence of a new research 
program whose results point in a radically different direction.  Research within this 
program has shown that people’s causal judgments can sometimes be influenced by their 
moral judgments. In other words, when people are wondering about the causal 
relationships between events, their conclusions can be influenced by their beliefs as to 
whether those events are morally good or morally bad.  At least on the surface, these 
results seem to serve as a challenge to the view that people assess causation by making 
something like a scientific judgment.  
 Yet researchers have not generally reacted by questioning prior assumptions about 
the nature of people’s causal judgments.  Instead, the usual view is that people truly are 
trying to make a purely statistical judgment but that certain processes are leading to 
‘distortions’ or ‘biases’ in these judgments.  The basic idea behind this view can be 
captured by the slogan The person as bumbling scientist.  In essence, what it says is that 
people are engaged in an attempt to make scientific judgments but that they are messing 
up somehow and thereby allowing moral considerations to influence their intuitions.   
 My aim here is to offer an alternative hypothesis. I posit a single underlying 
mechanism that explains both the impact of statistical considerations and the impact of 
moral considerations. The claim, then, is that we should abandon the idea that causal 
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judgments are fundamentally statistical and that the influence of moral considerations 
constitutes some sort of ‘bias’ or ‘distortion.’ In its place, we can adopt a theory 
according to which moral considerations truly do play a role in the fundamental 
mechanisms underlying causal judgments.  
 
The role of statistical considerations 
 George writes out what he regards as a profound and original idea and sends it off 
to an academic journal… But there is a bad outcome.  The paper gets a negative review 
and is therefore rejected.  In a situation like this, one can easily imagine a person 
wondering what exactly caused the bad outcome.  Was it something about the paper 
itself?  Or something about the reviewer?  Or a combination of the two?   
Of course, there is a fairly obvious sense in which both facts about the reviewer 
and facts about the paper stand in some sort of causal relation to the problem that results, 
and one could well imagine that people might be content simply to trace out these various 
causal relations and understand how each of them works.  Yet it appears that people do 
not actually proceed in that way.  Instead, they seem to select certain particular factors 
and refer to those alone as 'causes,' while classifying all the others as mere 'background 
conditions' or 'enabling factors.'  This process has come to be known as causal selection, 
and it plays an important role in folk judgments of causation.   
 A long tradition of research within social psychology has shown that the process 
of causal selection is sensitive in systematic ways to statistical considerations.  So, for 
example, consider the following two cases: 
(Case 1) George sends his paper to a number of different journals and 
conferences, and they all reject it.  Meanwhile, the reviewer accepts a number of 
other papers written by other authors.   
(Case 2) George sends his paper to a number of different journals and 
conferences, and they all accept it.  Meanwhile, the reviewer rejects every single 
paper he is given.   
Research shows that people’s causal judgments about George’s paper will depend on 
which of these two cases is the actual one (e.g., Hilton & Slugoski 1986; McArthur 
1972).  People will tend to say that the problem was caused by George’s paper in Case 1, 
whereas they will tend to say that the problem was caused by the reviewer in Case 2.   
 It is really quite a striking fact that people respond in this way.  After all, even if 
the reviewer was disposed to reject 99.99% of philosophy papers, one could still say that 
the bad outcome actually was caused by something about the paper – namely, the fact 
that it wasn’t one of the .01% of papers that the reviewer would be inclined to accept.  
Yet the available research shows that people tend not to respond in that way.  Instead, 
when faced with a case like this one, they say that the bad outcome was caused by 
something about the reviewer but wasn’t caused by something about the paper.  What we 
want to understand now is why exactly people take statistical considerations into account 
in this way.   
 The usual view within social psychology is that people’s judgments in such cases 
are more or less analogous to the judgments one might make in the course of a scientific 
inquiry.  Suppose that a scientist was trying to figure out whether the fates of academic 
papers were mostly due to something about the papers themselves or whether they were 
mostly due to something about the individual reviewers.  The first step would probably 
be to conduct an analysis of variance (ANOVA).  One could give a lot of different papers 
to a lot of different reviewers and try to figure out what percentage of the total variance 
was explained by facts about the papers and what percentage was explained by facts 
about the reviewers.  (As it happens, this experiment has actually been conducted.  The 
answer is that a substantial percentage of the variance is explained by facts about the 
reviewers and almost none is explained by facts about the papers; Blackburn & Hakel 
2006; Cole et al. 1981).   
 Of course, no one suggests that ordinary people make causal judgments by using 
precisely the same mathematical procedures that scientists use when calculating an 
ANOVA, but many researchers have suggested that we can think of the process 
underlying ordinary causal judgments as being similar in certain ways to the calculation 
of a full-fledged ANOVA (Försterling 1989; Kelley 1967).2  To a first approximation, the 
claim is that people tend to attribute outcomes to whichever factor they think explains the 
greatest percentage of the variance.  If they think that most of the variance is explained 
by facts about reviewers and almost none is explained by facts about the papers 
themselves, they will tend to say that the bad outcome was caused not by anything about 
the paper but solely by something about the reviewer.     
  
The role of moral considerations 
 But it seems that things are not quite so simple.  As a number of studies have 
shown, people’s causal judgments can be influenced not only by statistical considerations 
but also by moral considerations (Alicke 1992; Cushman 2006; Knobe & Fraser 2008; 
Solan & Darley 2001).  That is, when people are wondering whether x caused y, their 
judgments depend in part on whether they believe that x itself is morally good or morally 
bad.   
 Perhaps the best way of conveying the basic issues here is to give a simple 
example.  In one recent experiment, subjects were given the following vignette: 
The receptionist in the philosophy department keeps her desk 
stocked with pens. The administrative assistants are allowed to 
take the pens, but faculty members are supposed to buy their own.  
The administrative assistants typically do take the pens. 
Unfortunately, so do the faculty members. The receptionist has 
repeatedly emailed them reminders that only administrative 
assistants are allowed to take the pens.  
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On Monday morning, one of the administrative assistants 
encounters Professor Smith walking past the receptionist’s desk. 
Both take pens. Later that day, the receptionist needs to take an 
important message… but she has a problem. There are no pens left 
on her desk. (Knobe & Fraser 2008) 
From a statistical perspective, the behavior of the faculty member and the behavior of the 
administrative assistant seem more or less the same.  Both agents performed behaviors of 
quite ordinary sorts, and each behavior was related to the ultimate outcome in the same 
way.  Yet subjects did not treat these two behaviors alike.  They judged that the faculty 
member did cause the problem but that the administrative assistant did not cause the 
problem.   
 What we see here, apparently, is an impact of moral considerations on causal 
judgments.  It seems that people classify the faculty member’s behavior as wrong and 
that this classification then influences their judgments about whether his behavior caused 
the problem.  The key question now is why exactly this effect arises.   
 One obvious way to react here would be to conclude that results like this one call 
into question the ‘person as scientist’ theory.  Hence, one might say: ‘If people really 
were behaving like scientists, they would not allow moral considerations to influence 
their judgments.  So the available evidence now suggests that people actually aren’t 
behaving like scientists but are instead engaged in some very different sort of inquiry.’  
But that has not been the usual reaction thus far.  Instead, the usual reaction has been to 
suggest that there is a sense in which the original theory was actually right and it is the 
experimental subjects themselves who are wrong.  That is to say, researchers react to 
these results by suggesting that subjects truly are trying to engage in a purely statistical 
inquiry but that some further process is interfering here and allowing moral judgments to 
shape people’s responses.   
 One way to address this issue would be to look in detail at a number of specific 
hypotheses about precisely how people’s moral judgments could interfere with the proper 
operation of their causal reasoning.  Some researchers have suggested that the effects 
here are due to a motivational bias (Alicke 1992, forthcoming); others have suggested 
that the effects are due to pragmatics (Driver 2008a).  We could examine each of these 
hypotheses in turn, looking for confirming or disconfirming evidence.  This strikes me as 
an extremely valuable project (and one I have attempted elsewhere; Hitchcock & Knobe 
2008.; Knobe & Fraser 2008), but I will not be pursuing it here.   
 Instead, I want to proceed by offering a positive hypothesis about the underlying 
psychological mechanisms that generate these effects.  On this hypothesis, there is no 
sense in which statistical considerations truly do play a role in the fundamental 
competence while moral considerations are merely a ‘distortion’ or ‘bias.’  On the 
contrary, the hypothesis suggests that the very same process explains the use of both 
statistical and moral considerations.   
 
The classification of counterfactuals 
 In particular, I want to suggest that both of these effects can be explained in terms 
of a quite general theory about people’s capacity for counterfactual reasoning.  Hence, 
the suggestion will be that statistical and moral considerations end up having an impact 
on people’s causal judgments because they have an impact on the way people reason 
about counterfactuals in general.  
 The first thing to note here is that our capacity for counterfactual reasoning not 
only allows us to distinguish between counterfactuals that are true and those that are false 
but also allows us to distinguish between counterfactuals that are worth considering and 
those that we would do better simply to ignore.  Thus, suppose that I end up getting a bad 
grade on an important test.  I might immediately begin considering certain 
counterfactuals: ‘What if I had studied harder?’ ‘What if I had chosen not to go to that 
party last night?’ And many other similar thoughts might fill my mind.  But there are also 
counterfactuals that I would regard as silly and not worth considering.  I would never 
think: ‘What if the teacher had been struck by a meteor before she finished grading my 
exam?’   
 It is an important fact about human cognition that we are able to focus in this way 
on the relevant counterfactuals and ignore the irrelevant ones.  Counterfactual thinking 
can help us to solve many practical problems, but if we ended up reflecting in detail on 
any counterfactual that came to mind, we would never be able to get anything done.  
Ideally, then, our minds would somehow manage to focus in on the relevant 
counterfactuals and suppress all further thoughts about the irrelevant ones.  It seems that 
human beings actually are surprisingly good at accomplishing this task.   
 There has been a great deal of experimental research in psychology on people’s 
capacity for counterfactual reasoning, and a considerable amount is now known about the 
precise conditions under which people do and do not consider various counterfactuals.  
Here, however, we can proceed by borrowing just three basic principles from this vast 
literature: 
 
• The first principle says that people are inclined to consider counterfactuals in 
which events of statistically unusual types are replaced by events of statistically 
usual types (Kahneman & Tversky 1982; Roese 1997).  Example: if a student 
hands in her paper on a roll of toilet paper, we will be inclined to think about what 
would have happened if she had handed it in on computer paper instead.  
• The second principle says that people are inclined to consider counterfactuals in 
which bad events are replaced by good events (Kahneman & Miller 1986; Read 
1985).  Example: if a committee makes a bad decision, we will be inclined to 
think about what would have happened if it had instead made a good decision.   
• The third principle establishes a kind of default.  It says that, unless there is some 
specific reason to think about a given counterfactual, people will be inclined to 
classify it as irrelevant and not give it any further thought.3 
In articulating this third principle, I depart in certain respects from the traditional way of 
thinking about these phenomena within psychology.  The traditional view is that certain 
types of counterfactuals just never occur to people in the first place.  The hypothesis 
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being offered here is that there is actually something more complex going on.  It is not 
just that certain counterfactuals never occur to people; it is that these counterfactuals are 
actually classified as irrelevant.  To see the force of this claim, consider what might 
happen if we actively intervened in in a student’s life and forced him to consider what 
would have happened if his teacher had been struck by a meteor.  (One way to arrange 
such an intervention would be to ask the student to write a detailed essay on the topic.)  
After our intervention was complete, the student would have very vivid and definite 
views about precisely what would have occurred under the specified counterfactual 
conditions.  Nonetheless, the hypothesis is that the student would classify the whole 
counterfactual as irrelevant and that his beliefs about it would therefore have little impact 
on any further cognitive processes he might undergo.  Hence, if we later asked him to 
think about how he might avoid getting bad grades in the future, he would not begin by 
thinking: ‘Well, I would have avoided this bad grade if my teacher had only been struck 
by a meteor…’  And similarly for any other aspect of cognition.  No matter where we 
look, we will find a certain resistance to considering counterfactuals that have been 
classified as irrelevant.   
 Ultimately, the hope is that we can draw on these very general claims about 
people’s use of counterfactuals to explain the puzzling experimental results concerning 
people’s judgments of causation.  It is important to emphasize, however, that our claims 
about people’s use of counterfactuals do not themselves depend on evidence from studies 
of causal reasoning.  Instead, these claims are based on independent evidence.  (The 
experimental studies look directly at people’s counterfactual reasoning, not at their 
judgments of causation.)  Our overall theory can therefore draw on two different sources 
of experimental evidence.  First we look at studies of counterfactual reasoning and 
thereby construct a general theory about how people use counterfactuals; then we take 
this general theory and try to use it to explain the results of experiments about people’s 
causal judgments. 
 
Explaining the effects 
 To get from this general theory of counterfactuals to specific predictions about 
causal judgments, we need to introduce an additional assumption, namely, the assumption 
that people arrive at causal judgments by making use of counterfactuals.   
 Fortunately, we have good reason to believe that this assumption is correct.  A 
wide variety of theories of causal judgment suggest that these judgments actually do rely 
on counterfactuals in one way or another (e.g., Collins et al. 2001; Hitchcock 2008; 
Lewis 2000; Woodward 2003).  These theories differ from each other in a number of 
important respects, but those differences will not be relevant here.  Instead, we will 
simply be relying on the basic claim that people make judgments about whether a given 
event caused an outcome by considering counterfactuals in which that event does not 
occur.   
 Armed with this assumption, we can now reexamine the experimental results 
concerning people’s causal judgments.  The aim will be to show that it is possible to 
explain the patterns we observe in these judgments by drawing on a general theory of 
counterfactual reasoning.   
 First, consider the role of statistical considerations.  Our example here was the 
paper that had been submitted for review at an academic journal.  The paper, let us 
suppose, is good enough that it would normally be accepted, but it has been sent to a 
reviewer who has a tendency to reject almost every manuscript he receives.  The question 
now is how people will determine what caused the bad outcome.   
 The thing to focus on here is the general principle that people tend to consider 
counterfactuals in which events of unusual types are replaced by events of usual types.  
Since the reviewer is taking a very unusual approach to the manuscript, people 
immediately consider the counterfactual in which he takes a more usual approach.  That 
is, they consider a counterfactual of the form:  
(1a) If the reviewer had applied a more ordinary standard to the manuscript… 
The evaluation of this counterfactual then leads (in accordance with whichever theory 
turns out to be correct) to a judgment that the bad outcome was caused by the reviewer’s 
unusual standard.   
 But there is also another aspect to the situation.  We have been assuming that the 
reviewer does not reject absolutely all manuscripts and that there was therefore some way 
of writing the paper that would have led it to be accepted.  (For concreteness, we might 
suppose that the paper would have been accepted if it had offered fulsome praise for the 
reviewer’s own prior work.)  Suppose, then, that people began wondering whether the 
bad outcome was actually caused by something about the paper – namely, the fact that it 
wasn’t one of the .01% of papers that the reviewer would have accepted.  To address this 
question, they would have to consider the counterfactual:  
(1b) If the paper had been one of the .01% that fulsomely praised the reviewer’s 
prior work… 
But there is no principle that picks out this counterfactual as a relevant one.  Hence, the 
counterfactual is classified as irrelevant, people do not give it any further consideration, 
and the properties of the paper itself don’t end up being regarded as causes of the 
outcome.   
 A similar approach can be applied to understanding the role of moral 
considerations.  Our example here involved a professor and an administrative assistant 
who each take a pen from the receptionist’s desk.  By the second principle laid out above, 
people should immediately be drawn to counterfactuals that involve changing bad events 
to good ones.  Thus, they should be drawn to consider counterfactuals of the form: 
(2a) If Professor Smith had not taken a pen… 
And they should thereby end up concluding that Professor Smith’s decision to take a pen 
was a cause of the outcome.   
 But now suppose people begin wondering whether the outcome was also caused 
by the administrative assistant’s behavior of taking a pen.  They would have to consider 
counterfactuals of the form: 
(2b) If the administrative assistant had not taken a pen… 
But there is no principle that would lead people to classify this second counterfactual as 
relevant.  It is therefore classified as irrelevant and blocked from playing further roles in 
cognition.  Ultimately, people do not end up concluding that the administrative assistant’s 
behavior caused the outcome.   
 What we have here is a rough sketch of an explanation of the effects described 
above.  Clearly, more work will be needed before this explanation can be considered 
complete, but it should be possible to see, at least in outline, how the various 
experimental results are to be explained.  Above all, it should be clear that the 
explanation being offered here departs quite radically from the ‘person as scientist’ 
theory.  If this explanation is on the right track, people’s judgments may sometimes 
mimic the results of a systematic ANOVA, but the basic logic underlying their responses 
is fundamentally different from anything one might find in a purely statistical analysis.  
In particular, it seems that the very same process that allows people’s judgments to be 
affected by statistical information also allows them to be affected by moral 
considerations.   
 
Conclusion 
 The explanation being offered here has a somewhat unusual character, and it may 
therefore be helpful to say a few additional words about how it is supposed to work and 
how it contrasts with other explanations that have been offered for the same phenomena.   
 In thinking about patterns in folk judgments, researchers are often drawn to a 
mode of thought that might be called teleological.  That is, researchers are often drawn to 
the thought that folk judgments must be serving some sort of purpose in people’s lives 
and that we can gain an understanding of why people make these judgments in the way 
they do by thinking about how they thereby serve that purpose.  This mode of thought is 
especially tempting in cases, like the one under discussion here, in which people’s 
judgments show highly complex patterns.  There is an almost overwhelming tendency to 
suppose that all of this complexity must have arisen because it helps people to 
accomplish some important purpose.   
 It seems clear that, this sort of thinking is at work in the ‘person as scientist’ 
theory.  The basic intuition there is that the point of making causal judgments is to 
achieve a kind of proto-scientific understanding of the world.  If the only considerations 
relevant to that sort of understanding are the statistical ones, then it is assumed that the 
underlying competence will only take statistical considerations into account.  Any use of 
other sorts of considerations must involve some sort of interference with the proper 
workings of the mechanism.   
 On the view presented here, by contrast, it is somewhat difficult to see precisely 
what purpose the underlying competence might be serving.  Hence, a person might ask: 
‘Why on earth would someone mix together statistical and moral considerations in this 
complex way?  What possible purpose could all of this processing really serve?’  If no 
answer was forthcoming, such a person might conclude that moral considerations must 
not be playing a role in the competence after all.   
My response to this worry is to reject the whole idea that people’s underlying 
competence should be understood as the optimal way of achieving some particular 
purpose.  After all, it is not as though this competence was designed by an engineer who 
started from scratch and simply tried to create a mechanism that could do the best 
possible job of generating causal judgments.  On the contrary, the competence is best 
understood as something cobbled together from parts that originally served a different 
purpose.  (Think of the way people sometimes light a fire by using newspaper as 
kindling.  The newspaper is covered in writing – but not because that writing in any way 
contributes to the function of lighting fires.) 
When we consider the matter from this latter standpoint, it is not at all difficult to see 
why statistical and moral considerations play the role they do.  It is not that these 
considerations came to play a certain role because they could thereby contribute to the 
purpose of people’s causal judgments.  Rather, the use of these considerations is simply 
built into the fundamental mechanisms that subserve people’s counterfactual reasoning.  
Any aspect of human cognition that makes use of counterfactuals will be affected in some 
way by the structure of these mechanisms.  Since causal judgments make use of 
counterfactuals, and since moral considerations play a role in the mechanisms underlying 
counterfactual reasoning, moral considerations end up playing a role in causal judgments 
as well.   
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